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Regulating the Corporate Tap: Applying Global 
Administrative Law Principles to Achieve the Human Right 
to Water 
KRISTIN L. RETHERFORD* 
“Under the current model of globalization, everything is for sale. Areas 
once considered our common heritage are being commodified, 
commercialized and privatized at an alarming rate. Today, more than 
ever before, the targets of this assault comprise the building blocs of 
life as we know it on this planet, including freshwater, the human 
genome, seeds and plant varieties, the air and atmosphere, the oceans 
and outer space. The assault on, and defence of, the commons is one of 
the great ideological and social struggles of our times.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 28, 2010, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a 
momentous resolution establishing the right to safe and clean drinking water as 
“essential for the full enjoyment of the right to life.”2 Shortly after, on September 
30, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council, approving a second 
resolution, declared that water and sanitation are human rights derived from the 
right to an adequate standard of living.3 The resolution held that this right is 
“inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, as well as the right to life and human dignity.”4 According to 
Catarina de Albuquerque, the U.N. Independent Expert on human rights obligations 
related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, “[T]his means that for the 
UN, the right to water and sanitation, is contained in existing human rights treaties 
and is therefore legally binding. . . . [T]his landmark decision has the potential to 
change the lives of billions of human beings . . . .”5 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Class of 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to 
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 1. Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, Recipients, Acceptance Speech at The Right 
Livelihood Awards 2005 (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.rightlivelihood.org/
barlow_and_clarke_speech.html. 
 2. G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010). See MAUDE 
BARLOW, OUR RIGHT TO WATER: A PEOPLE’S GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS’ 
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO WATER AND SANITATION 4 (Council of Canadians 2011), 
available at http://www.canadians.org/water/documents/RTW/righttowater-0611.pdf. 
 3. Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, Human Rights 
Council Res. 15/9, 15th Sess., Oct. 6, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9 (Sept. 30, 2010). 
See BARLOW, supra note 2, at 4. 
 4. H.R.C. Res. 15/9, supra note 3, ¶ 3. 
 5. UN United to Make the Right to Water and Sanitation Legally Binding, OFF. OF THE 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Oct. 1, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
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These two resolutions represent remarkable progress in the struggle for water 
justice, the human rights movement, and the environmental movement. The U.N. 
rarely recognizes new human rights; it is even rarer for a right that has become so 
politicized over the years to be recognized.6 However, these potentially powerful 
resolutions have only provided the countries of the world with guiding principles 
on how to manage and distribute their water supply, and they will only be as 
meaningful as the people and governments allow them to be. 
One of the significant obstacles facing the realization of a right to water is the 
increasing occurrence of water privatization contracts in developing countries.7  
Water privatization, which is the governmental sale of water services including the 
maintenance, planning, and operational responsibilities to a private company,8 
should bring about efficiency and improvements in living conditions since 
specialized private companies have the knowledge and resources to expand and 
upgrade services that governments typically do not possess.9 However, the results 
of these contracts have not been beneficial to the people and their land in 
developing countries, as profit-seeking agendas prioritize shareholder expectations 
and quarterly earnings to the needs and values of the people they are meant to 
service.10 
This Note argues that unregulated water privatization undermines the United 
Nations’ recognition of a human right to water. While monitoring and regulatory 
oversight of water privatization still, in theory, fall within the state’s purview, 
whether or not such monitoring is effective or even occurs is less certain.11 
Furthermore, international regulation is wholly ineffective, as most codes of 
conduct, guidelines, and compacts are merely voluntary and have little or no 
enforcement mechanisms.12 Therefore, a human right to water can only be achieved 
through more effective governance mechanisms and public participation, and 
principles of global administrative law may be the best suited means to realize this 
right. 
Part I of this Note provides background as to the great role economic 
globalization has played in shifting the control of water services throughout the 
world and introduces the concept of global administrative law. Part II discusses the 
emergence of powerful transnational corporations in the water sector and the 
current state of, or lack of, enforcement mechanisms to constrain their practices and 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10403&LangID=
E. 
 6. See BARLOW, supra note 2, at 5. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See THE AGE OF COMMODITY: WATER PRIVATIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 14 
(David A. McDonald & Greg Ruiters eds., 2005). 
 9. See generally PETER H. GLEICK, GARY WOLFF, ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI & RACHEL 
REYES, THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND 
PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER (2002) (explaining the various pros and cons of water 
privatization contracts). 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
 12. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global 
Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143, 147 (2005); David Vogel, The Private 
Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 184 
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). 
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agendas. Part III reveals the various economic, environmental, and social 
consequences of unregulated water privatization in the developing world, with a 
particular focus on the failed water privatization attempt in Cochabamba, Bolivia 
and the currently failing water privatization concession in Jakarta, Indonesia. Part 
IV concludes by conceding that privatization is an irreversible trend and argues the 
right to water can only be achieved through a transformation of the current state of 
law. By applying principles of global administrative law to various aspects of water 
privatization bidding processes and implementation of contracts, it may be possible 
for states to reconcile water as both a social and economic good. 
I. HOW GLOBALIZATION CHANGED THE VALUE OF WATER 
To have a real discussion of how municipalities under water privatization 
contracts can benefit from global administrative law, it is crucial to first explore the 
various effects that globalization has had on the water sector and the dominant 
actors within it. This Part first considers the various arguments surrounding the 
globalization debate, and then turns to problems that can arise when water becomes 
a commodity as a result of economic globalization. Finally, the effects of 
globalization on governance mechanisms is explored, and a new kind of law is 
introduced that may be best suited for the regulation of global issues such as water 
distribution and human rights. 
A. The Globalization Debate 
When the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written, the right to 
water was not mentioned.13 This omission was not the result of deliberate 
discussion and thoughtful debate, but rather quite the opposite. At that time, no one 
imagined a world without clean, abundant water because the assumption was that 
water was self-replenishing, and that the hydrologic cycle would simply replace 
any water used or abused.14 With this false notion in mind, people, businesses, and 
governments “polluted, mismanaged, and displaced water as if it was 
indestructible.”15 The driving force behind this increasing disregard for the intrinsic 
value of water, many argue, was the direct result of globalization.16 
Globalization can be described as the “expanding scale, growing magnitude, 
speeding up, and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social 
interaction.”17 The term denotes a “shift or transformation in the scale of human 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); UN Recognises Water as a Human Right, SOUTHCENTRE.ORG, 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1380%3Asb5
0&catid=144%3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en. 
 14. See BARLOW, supra note 2, at 6. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See, e.g., MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE 
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 79–83 (2002); MATTHIAS FINGER & JEREMY 
ALLOUCHE, WATER PRIVATISATION: TRANS-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE RE-
REGULATION OF THE WATER INDUSTRY 2–7 (2002). 
 17. See David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An 
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social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power 
relations [across borders].”18 However, there is no one agreed-upon definition of 
globalization, and the emotions that arise when thinking about it are often quite 
polarized.19 It has been said that every generation has concepts that capture the 
public imagination, and it appears that globalization is one for this age: “The 
term . . . crystallizes both the hopes of some people that we will finally achieve a 
global society and the fears of many others that their lives and jobs are threatened 
by forces beyond their control.”20 
In theory, globalization should benefit all people because it can produce greater 
overall economic value. Globalization has the potential to help developing nations 
catch up to industrialized nations much faster through increased employment, the 
breakdown of trade barriers, and the advancement of technology and 
communication.21 The term itself seems to suggest integration and coordination, but 
globalization has clearly not resulted in a “harmonious world society or a universal 
process of global integration in which there is a growing convergence of cultures 
and civilizations.”22 Anti-globalists argue that globalization weakens national 
sovereignty and allows rich nations to outsource domestic jobs and businesses 
overseas where labor is cheaper and environmental standards are less strict.23 These 
critics do not see the opportunity for prosperity, peace, and democracy claimed by 
globalization’s supporters. Rather, they see a greater potential for conflict, extreme 
self-interest, unbridled corporate power, and disregard for people and 
communities.24 
B. Economic Globalization and the Commodification of Water 
The anti-globalist position becomes stronger when one considers the effect that 
globalization has had on the exploitation of public resources such as water. 
                                                                                                                 
Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1, 4 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER]. 
 18. See id. 
 19. The World Bank has even stated that: “Amazingly for so widely used a term, there 
does not appear to be any precise, widely-agreed definition. Indeed the breadth of meanings 
attached to [globalization] seems to be increasing rather than narrowing over time, taking on 
cultural, political and other connotations in addition to the economic.” Michele Putko, 
Defining and Quantifying Globalization 2 (Mar. 15, 2006) (strategy research project, U.S. 
Army War College). 
 20. Peter A. Hall & Sidney Tarrow, Globalization and Area Studies: When Is Too Broad 
Too Narrow?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 23, 1998, available at http://chronicle.com/
article/GlobalizationArea/99332/. 
 21. See generally David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, in THE GLOBAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 447, 447–54 (arguing that increasing 
globalization offers poorer economies many opportunities to improve their position in the 
world). 
 22. See Held & McGrew, supra note 17. 
 23. See Globalization: Progress or Profiteering?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 4, 2012), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/globalization.asp#axzz1ibEvrGBn. 
 24. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (1996); SAMUEL P. 
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996). 
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Through economic globalization—which is the increasing economic 
interdependence of national economies across the world through a rapid increase in 
cross-border movement of goods, services, technology, and capital25—industrial 
production has been able to reach new levels. Such emphasis on growth, however, 
creates impediments for competing countries trying to make preservation or 
conservation a priority.26 Increasing consumption and profit maximization take 
precedence over water use efficiency, conservation improvements, and even citizen 
need. 
The predominant ideology that has emerged as a result of this increasing 
economic globalization is the Washington Consensus model, which features 
substantial government deregulation of trade, investment, and finance.27 This 
model, led by the dominant economic powers and financial institutions,28 argues 
that progress can only be achieved in a tightly-integrated global economy 
established on principals of “trade liberalization, privatization, and macro-
stability.”29 Thus, it is essential to this model that capital, goods, and services move 
freely across borders, undisturbed by government intervention or regulation. This 
means, however, that even human and environmental concerns come second to the 
free flow of goods.30 In the global market, rectifying a depleted local resource is 
easy: “When the East Coast cod are depleted, we just move on to Chilean sea 
bass.”31 Businesses within this model do not view natural resources as a social 
good, but rather, an economic good to be managed by market forces just like any 
other commodity.32 
Commodification is defined as “the process of converting a good or service 
formerly subject to many non-market social rules into one that is primarily subject 
to market rules.”33 Once a public resource becomes established as a profitable 
commodity to be bought and sold on the free market, the more likely it will become 
the target of financial markets, and the more likely it will become exploited in order 
to maximize that profit.34 This exploitation will inevitably result in resource 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See RAKESH MOHAN JOSHI, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 9–10 (2009). 
 26. See Maude Barlow, The Fight for Liquid Assets: Transnational Corporations are 
Taking Control of a Basic Element of Life, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 16, 2000, at A15, available 
at http://www.commondreams.org/views/081600-106.htm. 
 27. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 82; Larry Catá Backer, Economic 
Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis of the State: Four Perspectives on the Emerging 
Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141, 145–46 
(2006). 
 28. These dominant powers typically include westernized countries such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, China, and Japan, and their complementary financial institutions 
consist of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
 29. See Backer, supra note 27, at 145. Micro-stability, these proponents claim, will 
supposedly be achieved in the long run. Id. 
 30. See Barlow, supra note 26. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 9, at 3. 
 34. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 92. See generally NICK WILKINSON, 
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 32–36 (2005) (discussing the 
basic profit-maximizing model). 
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scarcity, which will drive the prices of the good up even further.35 Coupled with 
increased demand, the potential for driving service and quality down is significant. 
While this process is not as grave a concern for traditional goods and services that 
are not absolutely necessary for life, and which have viable substitutes, the stakes 
become much higher and the consequences much more disastrous when 
considering such a vital, irreplaceable public resource such as the world’s water 
supply.36 
To further complicate issues, the global economy is fueled by the “financial 
casino,” in which investors speculate or gamble on fluctuations in the commodity 
prices.37 Instead of buying long-term shares in corporations, investors temporarily 
put their money in markets that offer high-end, short-term returns, and can at any 
time, and for whatever reason, withdraw their money and move it to a more 
profitable investment.38 Unfortunately, a country’s economy that relies on these 
investments can become destabilized at the whim of the market. 
There is no substitute for water; it is a necessary resource that is required for 
survival. Therefore, it cannot be left to the whims of the market for protection. 
Instead, water must be regarded as a public social good and be under the control of 
accountable institutions, not profit-seeking corporations. Treating water as an 
economic good has implications that reach far beyond the market—implications 
that touch the very way people live and interact with one another.39 
C. The Emergence of Global Governance 
As globalization increasingly expands throughout the world, the question 
becomes, how are organizations, institutions, and markets coordinated in this 
increasingly globalized world? Traditional domestic law is no longer best suited to 
address globalized issues that transcend national borders and laws.40 Therefore, 
many scholars have argued that the only way to truly address global issues such as 
water conservation and human rights is through some form of global governance.41  
Global governance has been defined as “the complex of formal and informal 
institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, 
markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through 
which collective interests on the global plane[t] are articulated, rights and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 92. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM (1997) (introducing the term 
and arguing that the western financial system has begun to look more and more like a 
casino). 
 38. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 93; STRANGE, supra note 37, at 163. 
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. See, e.g., Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and 
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 
(2006). 
 41. See, e.g., AFSHIN AKHTARKHAVARI, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2010); 4 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS (Roger Brownsword ed., 
2004). 
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obligations are established, and differences are mediated.”42 Basically, global 
governance is the management of global processes in the absence of a global 
government, and today, almost all human activity is subject to some form of global 
regulation.43 
Much of global governance is regulatory administration, and regulatory 
administration is organized and shaped by principles of administrative law.44 
Therefore, globalization brings with it an increase in the importance of 
administrative law. Based on these observations, many scholars have claimed that a 
new area of law is in development—global administrative law—in which important 
regulatory functions are no longer exclusively domestic, but have taken on a global 
nature.45 The substance of the rules created by global regulatory institutions is not 
the predominant concern, but rather the “actual or potential application of 
principles, procedural rules and . . . other mechanisms.”46 
With traditional international law, states agree to a set of norms and are free to 
accept or reject these norms at any time, but in order to be effective, international 
laws need to be ratified and implemented at the domestic level.47 On the other hand, 
legislative or primarily adjudicatory bodies do not make the rules for global 
administrative law. Instead, global administrative law has been said to encompass 
the “mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that 
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies.”48 
Such accountability provides for “adequate standards of transparency, participation, 
reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and 
decisions [these bodies] make.”49 Thus, there is more flexibility for governance of 
global issues under this approach than with traditional international law. And 
because global regulation is less and less defined in terms of agreements among 
states, the nature of the international legal order is changing in a way that requires 
such global action. 
The emergence of global administrative law mechanisms are already observable 
in many different areas: in notice-and-comment procedures adopted by 
international standard-setters such as the Basel Committee or the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),50 in the Inspection Panel set up 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. ARCHNA NEGI, COHERENCE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2008) (quoting Thomas G. Weiss & Ramesh Thakur, THE UN AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: AN IDEA AND ITS PROSPECTS (2006)) (presented as part of the Twelfth 
EADI General Conference). 
 43. See What is Global Administrative Law?, IRPA.EU, http://www.irpa.eu/gal-section. 
[hereinafter Global Administrative Law]. 
 44. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 2. 
 45. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 25 (2005). 
 46. Global Administrative Law, supra note 43. 
 47. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 3–4. 
 48. Kingsbury et. al, supra note 45, at 17, 27–28. 
 49. Id. at 17. 
 50. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 210 (2005). 
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by the World Bank to ensure its own compliance with its internal policies,51 and in 
U.N. responses to the hesitant engagement of domestic courts in reviewing Security 
Council sanctions against individuals.52 While presently unsystematized and 
somewhat fragmented as a body of law, these examples show that core principles 
are starting to emerge within this field of law.53 These principles include both the 
classical administrative law conceptions of fair and legal decision making and 
review procedures, and more substantive “good governance” values including rules 
requiring greater transparency and participation and the opening of new or 
strengthened avenues of judicial and administrative review.54 
It is clear that globalization forces have had a tremendous effect on the water 
sector. With such emphasis on growth, one would assume that there would be a 
similar increase in the availability of water, but that is not what we have seen. 
Turning water into a commodity creates a market in which only those who can 
afford the fluctuating costs of water will have access to it. However, while 
globalization has contributed greatly to this problem, at the same time, it has 
allowed for the emergence of a new field of law in which these problems can be 
addressed. As the next Part will explain, the necessity of these global governance 
values in the water sector is becoming increasingly important. 
II. WHO OWNS THE WATER? 
The changing role of the state, which is one of the major characteristics of 
globalization, is at the core of many of the issues that underlie failed privatization 
schemes and human rights violations. This Part explores the increasing power 
transnational corporations are gaining through privatization contracts at the expense 
of the state, and then argues that the negative results are largely due to the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms to restrain the oftentimes destructive and purely profit-
maximizing behavior of these corporations. 
A. Changing Role of the State 
As with the globalization debate, there is no clear consensus as to whether the 
changing role of the state is beneficial or detrimental. Some argue that while the 
role of the state is changing, it is not necessarily diminishing its position in the 
world, but rather its position in the global system is simply being transformed in 
new ways.55 For example, states have more options for participation in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 4. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Weiner, 
Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches 
to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2005). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through 
Government Networks, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 189; 
SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 45–96 (2007) (arguing against scholarship 
that assumes the national and the global are mutually exclusive and noting a new trend: that 
“the state is one of the strategic institutional domains in which critical work on the 
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governing of the global economy because the geography of economic globalization 
is strategic, and that this strategic geography is partially embedded in national 
territories.56 Furthermore, because the global financial system has reached “a level 
of complexity that requires the existence of a cross border network of financial 
centers,” some argue that the state will always play a critical role in the global 
system.57 
Others contend that these globalization forces are causing the state to lose its 
sovereignty, and in the process, the power of the state is shifting and becoming 
concentrated in new non-governmental actors, at great expense to the state.58 The 
real consequence of this transformation is that there is now a deficiency in 
legitimacy and public participation, because the market, by itself, “has never been 
able to provide . . . security against violence, stable money for trade and 
investment, a clear system of law and the means to enforce it, and a sufficiency of 
public goods like drains, water supplies, infrastructures for transport and 
communications.”59 The principle characteristic of this transformation is 
dependence, as the state’s role becomes limited to merely carrying out the will of 
non-resident actors.60 So as globalization welcomed these new actors into the world 
market, it failed to simultaneously provide for any protection from abuse by these 
actors to the land and people with whom they contract. 
Global administrative law seems pertinent no matter which position is taken 
because it presumes a newly emerging, “multifaceted global administrative space” 
comprised of various types of administrative institutions and entities working 
together.61 In this space, the distinction between domestic and international law has 
become blurred as the various regulators come together in international forums to 
decide administrative standards and procedures.62 Accompanying these “top down” 
approaches are typically “bottom up” approaches, which include, for example, 
domestic courts exercising judicial oversight of global regulation.63 So while it does 
appear that the role of the state would be transformed under global administrative 
law, it does not necessarily mean that its power is undermined; in fact, global 
administrative law could empower the states, as will be discussed later.64 However, 
as the law currently stands, it is not difficult to see some truth in the concerns the 
                                                                                                                 
development of globalization takes place . . . does not necessarily produce the decline of the 
state, but neither does it keep the state going as usual, nor does it merely produce adaptations 
to new conditions. The state becomes the site for foundational transformations. . . .”). 
 56. See SASSEN, supra note 55, at 57. 
 57. See id. at 68. 
 58. See, e.g., Susan Strange, The Declining Authority of States, in THE GLOBAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 17, at 127. 
 59. Id. at 128. 
 60. Backer, supra note 27, at 146. Backer argues that it does not matter whether you 
focus on the Washington Consensus of private economic transactional neo-liberal 
globalization, a more traditionally state-centered and international relations based analytical 
perspective, or a moral and political critique of Western-led economic globalization—they 
all ultimately posit the same consequences for the state. 
 61. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 45, at 18. 
 62. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 11. 
 63. See Andrew D. Mitchell & John Farnik, Global Administrative Law: Can It Bring 
Global Governance to Account?, 37 FED. L. REV. 237, 253 (2009). 
 64. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
820 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:811 
 
pessimistic perspective raises when considering the enormous power and influence 
these new unregulated actors have obtained. 
B. The Rise of the Transnational Corporations  
The most prominent new actors in the water sector are non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)65 and transnational corporations (TNCs).66 These actors have 
become partners of international organizations, which together, have started 
forming new governance mechanisms.67 The primary focus of this Note, however, 
is the emerging power of TNCs. 
TNCs, simply put, are corporations that operate in more than one nation at a 
time. TNCs have a tremendous impact on the global economy—in 2000, an 
estimated 63,000 were in existence, and in 1993, seventy percent of the world’s 
trade activities were related to them, and half of that trade was simply intra-firm.68 
While globalization arguably gave rise to the formation of these cross-border 
corporations, it is fair to say that TNCs have grown to the point where they are now 
actively driving the process.69 
In the global water sector, there are actually very few TNCs as a result of 
various mergers and acquisitions over the past couple of decades.70 Through this 
process, the power of production and marketing has become concentrated in the 
hands of fewer and fewer corporations and as a result, the “Water Barons” have 
emerged, consisting primarily of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (“Suez”), Vivendi 
Environment, and Thames Water.71 The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, the financial institutions that drive the global economic market, 
have further helped the Water Barons accumulate their tremendous economic and 
political power. These powerful and resourceful institutions have not only provided 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. NGOs are legally constituted organizations that operate independently from any 
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 70. See generally FINGER & ALLOUCHE, supra note 16, at 105–49 (explaining how 
mergers and acquisitions have affected TNCs in the water sector). 
 71. See BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 16, at 129; BLUE GOLD: WORLD WATER WARS 
(Purple Turtle Films 2008). 
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the financial assistance that is required to build such a global water market, but also 
the necessary legal leverage.72 By conditioning loans to weak, developing countries 
on agreements to privatize their water services—contracts that almost inevitably go 
to these Water Barons—the financial institutions undoubtedly put massive pressure 
on developing governments to sign contracts with these private corporations that 
otherwise may have never been considered.73 
Pessimistic about the changing role of the state, Maude Barlow, an influential 
water justice advocate, argues that over the past few decades TNCs have 
successfully managed to reinvent government in their own image, and the previous 
model of governance has been replaced by a new model—the corporate security 
state.74 Barlow argues that in this age of economic globalization, the state’s primary 
role is to maintain a “secure place and climate for profitable transnational 
investment and competition,” and the priority of this form of governance is to 
“provide security for corporations, not citizens.”75 
Increasing involvement and power of TNCs in the water sector is problematic 
because of their lack of corporate responsibility to the municipalities with whom 
they contract, including responsibilities pertaining to human rights and 
environmental standards. There have been attempts to regulate transnational 
corporate behavior through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,76 
the United Nations Global Compact,77 the UN Human Rights Commission Norms 
for Transnational Corporations,78 and the Technical Committee 224 of the 
International Organization for Standards (ISO),79 but these “soft law” attempts have 
been wholly inadequate largely due the fact that they are purely voluntary, and 
enforcement mechanisms are either weak, or in some cases, nonexistent.80 
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Because TNCs lack responsibility, they are free to act as they will, without 
considering their effect on the land or people they are contracted to service. Despite 
the fact that states retain the ultimate responsibility to monitor these corporations to 
assure no clear abuses are occurring, as the case studies will show, governments in 
developing countries often lack the power, influence, and resources to adequately 
regulate these powerful corporations.81 An alternative form of regulation must 
therefore be utilized in order to protect struggling governments from the abusive 
practices of these powerful corporations. 
What makes the situation even worse for these developing countries is that 
TNCs are actually protected under international law. Through bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), TNCs have legally enforceable rights and entitlements as foreign 
investors.82 These protections are highly controversial because they give TNCs the 
ability to actually trump national regulatory protection and to sue the state for 
compensatory damages if its behaviors are constrained by the state, even if by 
reasons of human welfare and environmental concerns.83 Thus, the protections 
under the current system are wholly one-sided, with the state and its people on the 
losing side. 
By selling or leasing long-term water services to TNCs, governments essentially 
hand over control of a vital public resource to noncompetitive, unaccountable, 
profit-seeking corporations that have no other real tie to the country with whom 
they are contracting. Significantly, this relinquishment of control limits public input 
into the operation of water services and removes a fundamental, legitimate service 
from the government. Money is not necessarily the issue. The real concern is the 
unrestrained power these corporations obtain in the process. Principles of global 
administrative law and the emergence of a global space would allow for new forms 
of participation and transparency that encourage public participation and restrain 
the behaviors of these corporations. But as the law currently stands, these goals are 
not likely to be achieved. 
III. EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The lack of regulation of these TNCs in water privatization contracts has led to 
dire consequences in developing countries around the world. While the economic 
consequences are often easy to discern, these contracts also have great social and 
environmental consequences that touch upon the very way people live and interact 
with one another. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See infra Part IV.A. 
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A. Economic Consequences 
TNCs often claim to be in business for altruistic reasons—to make clean and 
affordable water available for more people in the world.84 Indeed, privatization 
should, in theory, improve the living and working conditions of a people since 
specialized corporations have the experience, knowledge, and resources to expand 
and upgrade services that governments typically do not share.85 However, closer 
examination of these corporations’ practices reveals quite a different result: 
increased customer rates, extraordinary corporate profits, lower quality service, 
limited access, corruption and bribery, overuse, and exploitation. As Suez CEO 
Gerard Mestrallet once said, “Water is an efficient product. It is a product which 
normally would be free, and our job is to sell it.”86 
The Cochabamba and Jakarta water privatization contracts are two clear 
examples of the economic consequences felt by the governments and people under 
these contracts. While the Cochabamba case study provides a clear example of past 
water privatization failure and what led to the eventual revocation of the contract, 
the failing water privatization attempt in Jakarta, Indonesia provides an example of 
an ongoing struggle that could greatly benefit from principles of global 
administrative law. 
1. Bolivia Water Wars 
In 1998, the World Bank refused to guarantee a $25 million loan to Bolivia to 
refinance its water services in the city of Cochabamba unless the local government 
privatized its water services.87 The World Bank further recommended that there be 
no public subsidies to hold down the increases in the price of water service, and in 
great deference to the corporations, the contract even dollarized the water 
payments, which meant that if the value of the boliviano decreased against the 
dollar, the Bolivians’ water bill would increase to the equivalent in U.S. dollars.88 
Oscar Olivera, one of the central leaders in the Cochabamba protest movement, 
argues that the World Bank’s actions were the direct result of a western perspective 
that completely ignored the conditions of the Bolivian people.89 Whereas a $30 
increase in a westerner’s monthly water bill is typically not a very substantial 
increase, for many Cochabamban families, living where the official minimum wage 
was only about $41 per month, such an increase would have been catastrophic.90 
Regardless of this knowledge, and without any public input or comment, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. See Barlow, supra note 26. 
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Bolivian government privatized its water system with a forty-year contract to 
Aguas del Tunari, a corporation virtually unknown to the people of Bolivia.91 
At that time, only half of the population was connected to the central water 
system; others obtained water from cooperative water houses.92 Members of the 
community built these cooperative systems in a variety of ways; often, local 
neighborhoods contributed what they could, and sometimes NGOs assisted.93 
Under the privatization contract, however, such systems were deemed illegal 
because only the contracted company had the authority to distribute water.94 
The uninformed and ill-equipped corporation realized very quickly that in order 
to make the investments it had promised in the contract, it would have to raise 
consumer prices, and almost immediately rates increased an average of 35%,95 and, 
in the worst of the reported cases, some residents saw their water bills climb as 
high as 300%.96 However, residents did not see any immediate, noticeable 
improvements in their water services or quality to justify such an increase. As 
frustration mounted, thousands of protestors took to the streets and organized 
strikes that halted the Bolivian economy for days; as a result, the government was 
forced to revoke the contract.97 The people of Bolivia viewed this revocation as a 
great success, but the government was then faced with a long and grueling legal 
battle against Aguas del Turani.98 
Under the Netherlands-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty,99 Bolivia agreed to 
settle all disputes through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), an international arbitration tribunal that is part of the World 
Bank.100 While such a tribunal is an example of the emergence of global 
governance,101 it is also an example of how beneficial and effective global 
administrative law could be for the realization of human rights. 
For example, the main problems with the ICSID encompass many of the major 
inadequacies that almost all international institutions face: transparency, public 
participation, and legitimacy. In this case, the proceedings were done almost 
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entirely behind closed doors, and the ICSID refused to accept any amicus briefs or 
any other involvement by individuals or NGOs.102 The government further argued 
that the practices of the ICSID were essentially unfair because it allows TNCs to 
bring charges against the government, but it does not permit governments or 
affected social groups to take any similar action against corporations.103 To make 
matters worse, there is no effective process to challenge or appeal an ICSID 
decision.104 Under these conditions, governments face potentially great financial 
penalties for revising or revoking these privatization contracts, even if the revision 
or revocation is based on human welfare and environmental concerns. If a right to 
water is to be achieved, principles of global administrative law could greatly 
enhance the ability of these tribunals to assist in that realization.105 
While the scale of the Cochabamba protests was extraordinary, the experience is 
not an isolated one. All around the world people have tried to fight back against 
what they see as a widening socio-economic gap that is accelerated by neoliberal 
agendas.106 The claim is that while the service might be improving for some, it is 
usually at the expense of no access or poor quality to the poor because in order to 
maximize profits and please their shareholders, corporations will prioritize access 
and quality in the profitable areas rather than the marginal ones.107 The story of the 
Bolivia Water Wars provides such an example. While the Bolivian protests were 
effective at influencing the government to revoke the contract, similar social 
protests do not always guarantee protection as the next case study will show, and 
thus, it cannot be the only solution. 
2. The Present Fight: Jakarta, Indonesia 
The story of Jakarta is similar to that of the Cochabamba experience. It began 
when the World Bank and International Monetary Fund required water 
privatization in exchange for a $46 billion loan.108 Under great financial pressures, 
the government accepted the loan’s conditions and, in 1998, divided its water 
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system into two service areas.109 The two private companies awarded the twenty-
five year contracts were none other than Suez and Thames Water.110 
The government approved these contracts, despite the provision in the 
Indonesian Constitution declaring that “the land, the waters and the natural 
resources within shall be under the powers of the State and shall be used to the 
greatest benefit of the people.”111 Furthermore, Indonesia’s foreign investment laws 
excluded water from the sectors in which foreign companies could invest.112 In an 
attempt to provide legal justification for the transaction, however, the government 
created new laws and applied them retroactively.113 In addition to these great legal 
problems, the government directly appointed the private companies without 
competition and without any input from the public.114 
As a result of these political and legal issues, the government was eventually 
replaced by a more legitimate power. However, the new government was still too 
reluctant to revoke the contracts due to the potential legal action that would be 
taken by these powerful corporations and the tremendous financial penalty it may 
have to pay; instead, the new government attempted to renegotiate the contracts.115  
However, there remain deep flaws in the new contract: there are low penalties 
for the private sector’s failures; there are unclear investment targets; and, most 
importantly, consumer protection has been neglected altogether.116 Important 
aspects of the contract, such as the amount and priorities of investment, are still left 
solely with the company.117 
As a result of these flaws, the TNCs have been unable to achieve the target 
goals, and the amount of actual investment has been even lower than before the 
renegotiation.118 Residents currently criticize the quality and reliability of the 
service as they must still boil their water to avoid contamination and must often 
guess as to what times service will be available. Even now, the piped-water supply 
is not available to all populations in Jakarta.119 Despite these failures, the water 
tariff has increased significantly. 
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B. Environmental Effects 
The effect of transnational corporate control of water has had an environmental 
impact on communities as well. While the corporations focus on profit 
maximization, as they are designed to do, they neglect to concern themselves with 
environmental management and conservation efforts.120 As a result, they often 
exploit the land for short-term profit without considering the long-term 
consequences that such actions have on the land and its resources.121  
A region could be suffering from unhealthy, drought-like conditions, but these 
corporations will proceed to bottle their water supply and ship it across seas to sell 
in vending machines to people in no real need—people who usually only have to 
walk a few feet to find their water for free from a drinking fountain.122 The 
corporations can do this because they are not accountable to the interests of the 
citizens or the maintenance of the surrounding environment. However, water 
distribution through pipe systems, which is the predominant method because it is 
cheap and fairly simple, can be extremely land and water intensive, and the very 
methods of extracting water from the land without considering its limitations can 
have grave consequences. 
In Jakarta, for example, a decade of exploitation of groundwater sources has 
resulted in a rapidly-declining groundwater supply and increasing subsidence, 
which occurs when large amounts of groundwater are withdrawn from the land 
within a short amount of time.123 The effects of the current water extraction are 
becoming clear, as Central Jakarta alone experienced more than a three-foot drop 
over a twelve-year period.124 Such overexploitation and subsidence has the 
potential to cause many environmental consequences, such as increased risks of 
flooding, as evidenced by the 2007 flood that sent over 450,000 Indonesians fleeing 
their homes.125 
When TNCs can just pick up and move their investments when disaster occurs, 
there is little motivation to take these environmental consequences into account 
when they are making their agendas.126 As discussed, the current voluntary codes of 
conduct and guidelines are simply too weak to ensure that these corporations 
consider the environmental effects and adopt practices that prevent such abuses. 
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Considering that the global population has reached over seven billion, it is now 
more important than ever to be cognizant of the consequences these actions have on 
the limited resources that remain on this planet. There can be no realization of a 
human right to water if the environment is so diminished that it cannot provide an 
adequate water supply to the people. 
C. Social Consequences 
Often overlooked when exploring the consequences of TNCs on developing 
countries is the social impact these corporations have on a people and their 
traditional practices. Oftentimes, TNCs will come into local villages that have long-
practiced water distribution methods, which are sometimes very creative and 
efficient. These corporations will then cap their village well or replace old methods 
with prepaid water meters.127 Not only does this take away a very crucial function 
of that community, but as already discussed, it also comes at a high cost to its 
residents.128 
The impact is especially felt by communities that view the commons as a good 
for the whole community to share and do not perceive water as something to be 
bought or sold. Olivera explains that the Cochabamba people believe that the social 
character of water must be preserved and the accrued rights of the local water 
committees that have worked together to establish and maintain autonomous water 
distribution methods must be protected.129 It is offensive to these cultures’ people, 
who view water as something sacred, to be told they must pay for their water. This 
brings up all sorts of issues concerning the westernization of the developing 
world.130 
When corporations come into these villages and make water difficult to obtain, 
the community is broken up in a sense—people stop gratuitously sharing water 
with their neighbors because they know that if they did, they may not have enough 
for themselves or for their families.131 The lack of reliability of these services to 
these poor communities intensifies the problems. There are many stories of fights 
in these communities over mere buckets of water. To a westerner, this might not 
make much sense, but, to those who depend on this water for survival, the priorities 
of life become much different.132 
There is one story that encompasses so many of the social consequences from 
these water privatization schemes that is truly hard to forget. In many of these 
communities where prepaid meters are installed, parents and heads of households 
often take their tokens to work with them to ensure they are not stolen during the 
day, but this means that the children are left home without any water for the entire 
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day.133 One day, a shack caught fire in one of the local villages, but there was no 
water available to stop the fire. The neighbors refused to use their tokens to help 
put the fire out because that would mean they would be left without water.134 
Without any fire services available in the area, the shack burned to the ground; to 
the community’s dismay, two little girls were in the shack and died.135 
Communities that at one point would never have even hesitated to help out their 
fellow neighbors now have to consider the economic consequences of their every 
decision. As one local said, “these corporate projects are taking away our 
humaneness.”136 
IV. HOW TO RECONCILE WATER AS AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOOD 
The current forms of privatization that are dominating the global water sector 
are incompatible with the recognition of a human right to water. Corporations are 
not created for social purposes to provide services to those in need—they are 
designed solely with the goal of profit maximization. However, the private sector’s 
failure to provide better water services does not just reflect the flawed principles of 
corporate water privatization. It also reflects the failure to protect the people’s 
interests through effective regulations and governance mechanisms. In this era of 
globalization, the traditional governance structures are no longer best suited to 
regulate transnational corporate behavior and complex global issues. Because of the 
power and influence TNCs have obtained in the water sector, the state should not 
be the only one burdened with the obligation to protect human rights. 
A. The Need for Global Governance 
Economic globalization is an irreversible phenomenon. Therefore, we must 
adopt new laws and principles in order to make the right to water meaningful 
within the current system. However, it is important to first recognize that while the 
state does need to play a significant role in the effective monitoring and regulation 
of these corporations, there is also a strong need for some form of global 
governance in the water sector. These corporations are especially difficult to 
monitor, as they lack direct accountability to the public and have no real ties to the 
country with which they contract, and therefore have no reason to restrain their 
destructive behaviors.137 This unchecked corporate power cuts off the traditional 
channel of democratic accountability and leaves the public completely out of the 
decision-making process of a one-time public good. 
The Jakarta case study provides one example of the ineffectiveness of state 
regulation of TNCs. Upon privatizing its water services, the government 
established the Jakarta Water Regulatory Board to monitor the corporations. 
However, it had very little real power to function effectively because, as a weak 
government, it ended up on the wrong side of a one-sided contract that left out clear 
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mechanisms for independent audits and monitoring devices and was ultimately 
unable to adequately fund the Board.138 After prices increased substantially, with 
no apparent justifications, the TNCs denied the public any access to the company’s 
financial reports and never even made an attempt to justify the increases.139 
Consequently, the government and the public were left with no real viable options 
to contest the price hikes. 
However, even greater concerns arose because there was no public input or 
participation into the selection of these companies to begin with, nor any open 
competition, to ensure a fair bid.140 Instead, the government was the sole decision 
maker, and there are convincing arguments that particular governmental officials 
stood to gain greatly from the agreements.141 Therefore, even the states themselves 
need to be monitored to ensure that they would work for the best interests of their 
citizens. 
While the Jakarta protests have not seen the same success the Bolivian people 
were able to achieve, this is not for a lack of trying. Individuals, communities, 
NGOs, and trade unions have organized international petitions and gathered in the 
streets of Jakarta and at city hall to protest against a government they feel is putting 
the interests of its citizens second to the interests of the corporations.142 Political 
resistance to privatization is a “formidable obstacle to municipalities looking to 
explore a sale of their water assets to a private company.”143 However, as the 
Jakarta protests exemplify, change is not a guarantee. 
B. How to Apply Global Administrative Law Principles 
There are numerous ways in which global administrative law could be applied to 
the global water sector to assure the right to water is achieved. First, the struggle 
for participation, transparency, and legitimacy in the decision-making process is 
one of the central strands of administrative law. Therefore, it is possible that such 
administrative law at the global scale could help fill this democratic deficit. 
However, in order to assure that these principles are achieved, there is a need for a 
global regulatory monitor, which could be found in the ISO, World Bank, or 
International Monetary Fund, after some reform of these institutions’ current 
practices. Lastly, judicial review and the recognition of these principles could 
provide the legal authority and bases for governments and TNCs to guide their 
behaviors. 
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1. Good Governance Principles and Values 
The first way to implement global administrative law into regulation of the 
water sector is through the principles of transparency and participation in the 
privatization bidding process and selection. In both the Cochabamba and Jakarta 
case studies, the public had absolutely no input and was not even informed about 
the water privatization contract.144 This allowed the corporations to gain contracts 
under almost no scrutiny, which arguably led to many of the complications with 
each contract’s implementation. The lack of public participation and transparency 
also intensified the public’s frustration and growing resentment toward the Bolivian 
government. If individuals and NGOs were more involved in the process and were 
given the ability to participate in notice-and-comment periods as these contracts 
were being negotiated, collusive practices or ill-equipped investment strategies 
would be more likely to be uncovered and prevented, and citizens would be less 
inclined to take their dissatisfaction to the streets, as this is typically saved as a last 
resort for many. 
These principles would also be helpful in realizing more efficient contracts and 
services by requiring corporations to produce evidence of reasoned decision 
making in accordance with administrative fairness and rationality. This could 
require consultation or simply open procedures such as investment targets. As 
shown in the Jakarta case study, citizens were never even told why prices were 
increased, and all requests to the information were denied.145 This transparency 
could easily be improved through a requirement, enforced by global administrative 
bodies, that significant price increases be accompanied by financial statements 
upon request. Requiring informed reasoning and capabilities to take on a large 
project such as water privatization could have prevented many of the price hikes 
experienced in Cochabamba and Jakarta, as these companies were unprepared to 
make the investments required to fulfill their contracts. 
 2. The Use of Global Monitors  
The argument is that corporations are restrained to act in an efficient manner 
through market mechanisms,146 but this could only be true if the corporations really 
are subject to the market consequences. As mentioned earlier, these contracts are 
typically one-sided; the Jakarta contract, for example, included profit guarantees to 
the corporations regardless of the market processes.147 Furthermore, privatization 
does not automatically increase competition. In the water sector, this is especially 
clear, as there are very few companies actually competing, and often colluding 
together, for these contracts.148 
Fair contracts and healthy competition would help ensure the best services and 
prices for the people. One way to achieve this goal is through the use of a global 
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monitor. International organizations, such as the ISO, could be used to act as anti-
trust regulators, reviewing and investigating contracts before they are implemented 
to make sure there is no collusion or coercive activities occurring.149 Such a 
regulator could also encourage governments to be assertive by requiring beneficial 
conditions for the people such as price ceilings based on income or compensation 
for the confiscation of self-sufficient water distribution systems. No longer should 
struggling governments be compelled to sign contracts that discourage public 
subsidies to hold down price increases or that protect corporate profits by 
dollarizing water payments, as seen in the Cochabamba privatization contract.150 
The ISO could also be useful in strengthening and giving meaning to their 
current codes of conduct for these corporations in order to ensure that they take into 
account the effects they have on the people and the environment in which they 
contract with. The past attempts to compel these corporations to follow the codes of 
conduct and guidelines have failed because there is no real authority that monitors 
these corporations and compels them to adopt them into their procedures.151 The 
Jakarta case study shows the consequences of the lack of penalties for the failure of 
the private sector.152 
Other international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, could 
also be utilized as global monitors in this system of global governance. However, 
before we can even consider such an option, there must be a real discussion on 
significant institutional reform to assure that the same problems with the state are 
not simply transferred to the global level. 
3. Institutional Reform 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as two of the most 
powerful financial institutions in the global economy, have been at the center of the 
major economic issues of the past few decades.153 As this Note has illustrated, these 
powerful organizations can have great impact on the countries they lend to and 
supervise, so it is important to examine their agendas and the impacts of their 
actions before giving them more authority and power as global monitors. 
As the U.N. was established “on the belief that there was a need for collective 
action at the global level for political stability,” the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund were established “on the belief that there was a need for collective 
action at the global level for economic stability.”154 Initially recognizing that the 
markets were not perfect, these institutions now seem to endorse market 
supremacy.155 Even in the face of failed privatization attempts and mass citizen 
protests, they continue to assume that what has worked in one country shall work 
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everywhere in the world, but that is clearly not the reality, as the case studies have 
revealed.156 
However, it has been argued that the real problem is one of governance: “who 
gets to decide what they do” and how they do it.157 Dominated by the wealthiest 
industrial countries, most of their lending and activities take place in the developing 
world; even the countries’ own representatives do not have the people’s interest in 
mind, as they are typically chosen behind closed doors and closely tied to the 
global financial community.158 
These institutions are clearly not representative of the countries they are meant 
to serve. They are publicly funded by taxpayers’ money, yet, they remain 
unaccountable to the public, and their procedures are set without any input from the 
people.159 One way to resolve this problem is to leave elections of the country’s 
financial representatives to the people. While the initial voter turnout would 
probably be low, the electoral motive, and also special elections for removal, could 
ensure that these representatives keep the interests of the public as the top priority, 
thus, more adequately representing these developing countries in the global 
economy. 
It is important that these organizations do not pressure struggling governments 
into privatizing a vital public resource as a condition for a chance to better their 
position in this globalizing world. Rather, these institutions need to explore more 
alternatives to corporate privatization, such as leasing services to nonprofit 
organizations or creating some type of meaningful public-private partnership where 
the state retains ultimate policy-setting authority, but still allows for a specialized 
business to run the day-to-day operations for which they are best suited in the first 
place. However, privatization is not necessary, or even appropriate, everywhere, 
and these institutions need to recognize that in their lending practices. 
4. Judicial Review and Recognition of Principles  
Judicial assistance is crucial in the effort to make this right meaningful. If courts 
are willing to set precedent to act as guidelines for how governments should treat 
their water supply, then conservation and fair use will be more likely. Legislatures 
and courts must also work together to ensure that certain flexibilities are allowed in 
order to best reconcile corporate control of such a vital resource, such as removing 
the power of corporations to sue governments if their activity is constrained due to 
health or environmental concerns, such as was the case in Cochabamba. At the very 
least, judicial action should be guided by the principles of transparency and review, 
particularly in international arbitration settlements.160 TNCs could actually benefit 
from a functioning global administrative law that generates a global governance 
entity in order to support, rather than undermine, the legitimacy of these 
tribunals.161 
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Judicial recognition of this right in domestic courts is another way a “top down” 
approach could be useful, and a recent High Court Ruling in Johannesburg provides 
such an example.162 In 2006, the Kalahari Bushmen took the Botswana government 
to court when the government prioritized its land and water access to mining 
companies and tourism after diamonds were discovered and attempted to evict the 
Bushmen by capping their only major water borehole.163 While the court decision 
allowed the Bushmen to return to their land, it did not include the right to their 
water sources, so the Bushmen appealed to gain back this access.164 
One week before the U.N. voted to recognize the right to water, a High Court 
ruling again denied the Bushmen their water rights.165 However, in January 2011, 
Botswana’s Court of Appeals unanimously held that the Bushmen not only had the 
right to use their old boreholes but also had the right to sink new boreholes.166 
Noting the U.N.’s recognition of the rights, the Court called the Bushmen’s 
treatment by the government “degrading.”167 The Court further stated that it is 
“entitled to have regard to international consensus on the importance of access to 
water.”168 
Most countries have a rule that they have to interpret domestic law in light of 
international obligations such as the U.N. declaration of the right to water, and 
therefore, the recognition by the Botswana Court of Appeals should set an example 
for the courts of the rest of the world to exercise this power and make this right 
meaningful within the current system. 
CONCLUSION 
“When the United Nations recognized the human right to water and 
sanitation, humanity took a collective step forward in its evolution. But 
this alone is not enough.”169–Maude Barlow 
No acknowledgment of this right by itself can distribute water to the billions of 
people in need so long as the current system of economic globalization and 
unregulated corporate control remains unchallenged. The case studies provided 
illustrate just some of the dire consequences developing countries face within the 
current system, and they will continue to experience these detrimental effects 
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unless and until the current state of law is transformed. Because globalization is an 
irreversible phenomenon, in order to truly implement this right, the current 
economic system must be confronted, and new policies based on transparency, 
participation, and sustainability must be encouraged. 
This Note explains that, through the use of global governance mechanisms, the 
right to water can be meaningful, even within corporate privatization regimes. 
Global administrative law principles offer various ways to help realize this right 
through the implementation of good governance values, institutional reform, and 
judicial recognition. Through the collective efforts of representative financial 
institutions, global monitors, NGOs, and citizens of the world, these global 
administrative principles make it possible to achieve this momentous right—the 
protection of the world’s remaining water resources. 
 
  
